Prior to playing the actual game participants received a training of 20 rounds to familiarise them GSK-3 inhibitor with the controls and the mechanics of the game. During this training, the five auction items were replaced by abstract figures. After training, players could inspect the available auction items. All items (candle, pens, box of chocolate, one-way camera, herbal tea) were purchased at approximately the same price (4.5–5.0 Euro). The price of the items was not revealed to the participants. After inspection, players ranked the items according to their preference with 1 denoting the lowest and 5 the highest preference. Participants played 200 auctions (40 for each item) randomly interspersed. In each

round, players could distribute 100 points either to the auction item or to a monetary lottery with a price of seven

Euro, which was higher than the actual cost of each item. The player with the highest amount of points allotted to the auction would win the round. The points allocated to the lottery (divided by 100) represented the chance to win seven Euro in this round. For example, take two players who bid for an item. Player 1 bids 25 points and player 2 bids 40 points. In this round player 2 wins the item and has an additional chance of 60% to win seven Euro. Player 1 does not win the auction but has a 75% chance to win the lottery. We deliberately chose a lottery as second investment options for players to minimize decision biases due to risk sensitivity. That is, allocating points in either auction or lottery entailed the risk of losing points. Overbidding in our case occurred when the sum of both PF-02341066 solubility dmso players’ bids exceeded 71 (approximate value of each item: five Euro equaling Thalidomide 71 points). These calculations were not revealed to the participants. At the end of the game participants had to rank the items again for preference. One round was randomly selected for each player and the outcome was paid

to each participant. In other words, participants could actually win one of the items and an additional seven Euro. Participants who did not win either received three Euro alone. All participants received an additional show-up fee of five Euro. To assess participants’ private value for each item participants did not receive feedback on the outcome of the auction in the first five rounds of the experiment where all five items were presented. In all other rounds participants received feedback on whether they won the auction but not the lottery and how much the other player bid for the item. Since we were interested in exploring the interaction between private value, social influences, and competitiveness of the environment, we performed a manipulation on the items players saw in each round by matching preferences of players in the auction. We ordered items via the preferences participants gave prior to the auction. A pair of players would bid on the item with the same preference, which was not necessarily the same item.